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ABSTRACT
Thispaper considers thefollowingquestion: Would a "golden rule"
capital accumulation policy of equating the marginalproductof capital
to the rate of growth of population be appropriate in a mixedeconomy in
which the government does not have direct control overresource alloca-
tion but can use distortionary taxes to obtain resources foraugmenting
the private capital stock?
Thekey result derived hereis thatthegolden rule level of
capitalintensity remains optimal. if the tax structure that prevails at
the equilibrium does not alter the individual labor supply. This is true
even if the constancy of labor supply represents a balancing of income
effectsand substitution effects of a distortionary tax. Incontrast, if
the form of the tax and the nature of the utility function imply that labor
supply is distorted, the optimal capital intensity will in general not
correspond to the golden rule level.
Martin Feldstein
National Bureau of Economic Research
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Cambridge, MA 02138
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• Martin Feldstejn*
In a centrally controlled economy, a government thatwanted to
maximize the steady state value of the utility ofa representative
individual would divide national resources betweenconsumption and
capital accumulation to equate the marginal product of capital to
the rate of growth of population (Phelps, 1961). Wouldsuch a
"golden rule" capital accumulation policy be appropriate ina mixed
economy in which the government does not have direct control over
resource allocation but can use taxes to obtain resources for
augmenting the private capital stock? Surprisingly, this
fundamental question in the theory of optimal taxation has not
previously been addressedJ
The present paper shows that the golden rule of thecentrally
controlled economy may or may not be appropriate in a mixedeconomy
and that whether it is or not depends on the behavior of labor
supply and on the nature of the available tax. The key result is
*Harvard University and the National Bureau of Economic Research.
am grateful for discussions of this subject with John Fleming, Paul
Krugman and Lawrence Lindsey.
'Diamond (1963) showed thatgovernment debt imposes a burden on
future generations wherever the golden rule conditions does not hold
but he did not go on to examine the question of optimal tax policy.
Barro's (1979) discussions of optimal debt assumes explicitly that
changes in government capital accumulation would be completely offset
by induced changes in private capital accumulation; I shall ignore such
induced intergenerational transfers in the present study. Atkinson and
Sandmo (1980), Ring (1980) and others discuss how the optimal mix of
consumption and income taxes depends on whether the economy is at the
golden rule point but do not consider whether it is optimal to use a
distortionary tax to achieve the golden rule level of capital intensity.—2—
that the golden rule level of capital intensity remainsoptimal if
the tax structure that prevails at the equilibrium doesnot alter
the individual labor supply. Thepaper demonstrates that this
condition is satisfied for all individual utility functionsif
the government taxes only to affectaggregate capital intensity.
More generally, however, if the government must raisetax revenue to
finance government spending, the golden rule conditionis not
optimal unless either the labor supply is exogenously fixedor the
combination of the tax structure and the utility functionkeeps the
individually chosen labor supply unchanged.
The basic framework of this paper is an overlapping
generations model of steady state growth. Individuals work inthe
first period of their lives and are retired in the secondperiod.
The government can levy a tax on their labor income anduse the
proceeds to augment private capital accumulation.2 The individuals
divide their after—tax earnings between first periodconsumption and
saving for second period consumption, choosing in away that
maximizes their lifetime utility. The government'sproblem is to
set a tax rate that maximizes steady state utility subject to the
government's budget constraint, the capital accumulation relation,
and the behavior implied by individual utility maximization.
Section 1 begins the paper with an analysis of the command
economy. This provides a framework for describing the technical
assumptions and derives the optimum conditions when the government
has direct control over all resources. The second section then
2This could take the form of eithergovernment investment or
lending by the government to private firms. It is the opposite of
government debt creation.—3—
examines a mixed economy with individualsaving decisions but a
fixed labor supply.In Section 3 the assumption of a fixed labor
supply is dropped and it is shown that the golden rulelevel of
capital intensity remains optimal unless the taxstructure is
constrained to distort labor supply in equilibrium.The fourth
section then abandons the assumption ofa log—linear utility
function that was used in Sections 2 and 3 andderives the
optimality of golden rule capital intensity withoutany restriction
on the individual utility function. It is clear that thisgeneral
result depends on the absence of anygovernment spending. The fifth
section therefore extends the analysis toan economy in which taxes
must also finance government spending. In thiscontext, golden rule
capital intensity is optimal only if the taxes requiredto finance
government spending would not alter the supply of labor.
1. The Command Economy
Consider an economy of identical individuals eachof whom lives
for two periods. At tine t there areNt young individuals
("workers') and Nt(l+n)l older individuals ("retirees"),reflecting
the fact that the population grows at rate n. Eachworker supplies
an amount of labor, £ $andenjoys leisure 1—9,; retirees supply no
labor. The total capital stock is K; the capitalper unit of labor
will be denoted k =K/N
Production is governed by a constant return to scale
technology. Output per unit of labor is f(k), outputper worker is
£f and the narginal product of capital is f'
In steady state growth the rate of increase of thecapital
stock must equal the rate of increase of thepopulation:—4—
It/K =n.This implies that capital accumulationper worker,
k/N =nK/N=nki.The resources available for consumptionby
workers and retirees are equal to the difference betweenoutput per
worker and capital accumulation per worker:
c2
(1) c1 + ___= jf— nk2.
1 +n
where c1 is the consumption per worker andC2 is the consumption per
retiree. The l+n term reflects the fact that thereare 1+n times as
many workers as retirees.
If the utility of a representative individual iswritten
U(c1, c2, 1—2.), the government's problem is to choosec1, C2 and
to maximize this utility subject to the constraint ofequation 1.
Alternatively, using that constraint to substitute forC2 restates
the government's problem as maximizing U(c1,(l+n)(if-n]cQ-c1), 1—i)
with respect to c1, 9. and k. The first order conditionwith respect
to k is
(2) t32L(1+n)(f'_n) =0,
which implies that capital accumulation should be extendeduntil the
golden rule intensity (f'=n) is achieved.
The derivative with respect to c1 implies
(3) U1 —(l+n)U2=0,
indicating that the marginal rate of substitution between first and—5—
second period Consumption should equal 1+n.This is Samuelson's
(1958) famous biological interest rate foroptimal intertemporal
allocation of consumption. When themarginal product of capital
equals the population growth rate this isequivalent to equating the
marginal rate of substitution to 1+f'
The derivative with respect to the individuallabor supply
imp 1 i e s
(4)(1+n)(f—nk)1J2 —U3=0,
indicating that the marginal value of leisure mostequal the
increased utility of consumption that ispossible when leisure is
reduced by one unit. Mote that this is not theincreased output (f)
but the increase in output minus the increasedcapital accumulation
required to keep the capital per unit of laborunchanged (nk). This
is multiplied by 1+n because, since theolder generation is smaller
by a factor of l+n, the amount available forconsumption per retiree
is greater by a factor of l+n.
Examining the special case of the log-linearutility function
provides explicit solutions that are of interest inthemselves and
also useful for comparison with the resultsof sections 2 and 3.If
u =aZn c1 +(1—a)Zn c2 +Zn(1—fl, or, equivalently, u =aZn
+(1-a )Ln[Zf—nkZ—(1—n)c1] +Zn(1-fl, we obtain directly that £ =
(1+p)—l,c1 =a(f—nk)/(1+n) (l+p)andc2 =c1(1—a )(l+n)/a The
golden rule condition follows from the derivative ofu with respect
to k as(l-a)(f'-n)Z/(Zf_njçE_(1+)c1) 0. Notethat, in taking this
derivative, c1 and £ can be taken as constants sincethe government
sets them independently.—6—
2. A Mixed Economy with Fixed LaborSupply
In a mixed economy the government does not have directcontrol
over individual consumption and labor supply but canonly affect the
allocation of resources through the tax system. I shallassume that
the available tax is a linear tax on the labor incomeof workers.
If the wage rate is w per unit of labor, the taxcollected per
worker may be written (l—&)w+t Note that if 'r > O,'r is a
lump-sum tax while if t < 0, t represents an exclusion of —t1(1— 0
and makes the tax progressive. Similarly, 1— 0 is themarginal rate
of tax and 0 > 1 implies that the government subsidizeswages.
Each young individual works a fixed amount, Z,andtherefore
has after—tax income of e w £ —t.Iffirst period consumption isc1,
savings are owz—T—ci, and second period consumption is
(5) c2 =(ow'—t—
The total stock of privately—owned capital(Kg) is equal to the
savings done by the young of the previous generation:
(6) K =(ow—-r—c1)N(1+nY'-.
The growth of the capital stock is therefore
(7) =( en—r—c1)nN(l+nY-
since N =nN.In steady state equilibrium, the privately—owned
capital grows at the rate of population growth, =nor,




In steady state the private capital stock will have to be a constant
fraction of the total capital stock. Denoting that fractionby—7—
(i-y )sothat k =(1—y)k, equation 8 can be rewrittenas
(9)(l—y )xt= (0 w—r—c1)(1+n)l.
The growth of the government—owned capitalstock (Kg) is equal
to the sum of the return on the existinggovernment capital (Kgf')
and the tax collections [(l—0)wZ+ TIN:3
(10) kg =Kgf'+ [(l—S)wZ+t IN.
Since Kg/Kg =nis a condition of steady state equilibrium,we
obtain
N
(11) n =f'+ [(1—s )wt+r]—,
Kg
or, writing k =Kg/N
(12) (n—f')ykt= (l—8)wi+r
Note that if f' >n,a positive level of government—owned capital
implies that taxes are negative or, alternatively, thattaxes are
needed only if there is a government debt, i.e., ifK9<o. This
reflects the fact that the return on the government's
capital (Kgf'
exceeds the amount that is required to maintain a constantratio of
government capital per worker (nKg) .Ofcourse, with a positive
level of government spending, the optimal level oftaxes and
government capital may both be positive.
Combining equations 9 and 12 eliminates the capital division
constant (y)anddefines the capital accumulation constraint:
(13) —[(1—0)wL+t] =(f'—n)[ki—(0wt—'r1-c1)(l+nyl]
The term in square brackets on the right hand side of the
equation is the government capital stock per worker, that is, the
assume here that there is no government spending.—8—
difference between the equilibrium capital stockper worker and the
private saving per worker. This government capital stockearns a
return at rate V but requires investment at raten to maintain
itself. Thus the right hand side is thegovernments excess capital
income. The left hand side is the value of thosetransfers ex-
pressed as negative tax revenue.
The individual selects c1 to maximize utilityor, using
equation 5,
(14) u(c11c',) =u[c1, (6wZ—t—c1)(l+f')]
Knowing that c1 will be selected in this way, thegovernment
selects U to maximize this same utility functionsubject to the
capital accumulation constraint of equation 13. Stating theproblem
in this way implicitly takes tasa fixed progressivity parameter of
the tax system. Alternatively, U and tcanbe selected simul-
taneously subject to the capital accumulation constraint. With the
supply of labor assumed constant, there is no difference between
these two definitions of the problem sinceany combination of U and
Tthatyields a given revenue has the same effect on economic
activity.
To derive specific results requires an explicitparameteri—
zation of the utility function. The log—linear utility function
adopted in the previous section implies that the individual chooses
c1 to maximize
(15) u =inc1 +(1-a)Zn [(UwL—t—c1)(l+f')J—9—
The individual's chosen value of c is thus
(16)
The government's problem is therefore to choose e andttomaximize
(17) u =athta(ewL—t)]+ (l—)m [(1—a )(Ow-T )]
a)tn(1+f' )
or
(18) u =0 (Owt—t)+(1-a)j(1+f)
where 0isa constant.
The maximization of u is subject to the capitalaccumulation
constraint (equation 13) that establishes the link betweenthe tax
parameters and capital intensity and therefore between the tax
parameter and w and f' of equation 18. Equation 13 can be rewritten
in the form
w 2+ (f'—n)k Z
(19) OwL—t =-_______________________
a)(1+n)
The marginal productivity conditions imply that thewage rate per
per unit of labor is w =f—kf'.Thenumerator of equation 19 can





Note that, with fixed £ ,theexpression Ow t—t is a function of k
only. What matters in the utility function of equation 18 is not
the specific values of e and r but the combination OwR.—t and
equation 20 establishes that this can be written as a function of k
only.
Substituting 20 into 18 gives the final form of the
government's maximization:— 10—
(f—nk)
(21) u =+ Zn +(i—ct )m (l+f'). l+(f'_n)(l_ct )(l+n)
Althoughthe government does not control Ic directly, the policy
problem can be solved by obtaining the value of k that maximizes
equation 21 and then using 20 and the condition w =f—kf'to find
values of 0 and r that are consistent with that value of Ic.
Setting the derivative of u with respect to k equal to zero
yields:
f'—n (1— a) (l+n)f" (1— a )f"
(22) — + = 0.
(f—nk) l+(f'—n)(l—a )(l+nY4 l+f'
It is immediately clear that this is satisfied at f'n. This
establishes that in this case the golden rule level of capital
intensity remains appropriate even though the government does not
have direct control over resources but can influence the capital
accumulation process only by a tax on wage income.
Twoimplications ofthis result are of particular interest.
Sincef'=n at the optimum, itfollows from equation 14 that the
worker will allocate his net wage income between current consumption
and future consumption until u1 =(l+n)u2.This was the first order
condition in the command economy for the optimal allocation of
consumption between workers and retirees. Thus if the government
establishes the correct macroeconomic level of capital intensity,
the individuals will independently and automatically establish the
correct allocation of income between present and future and
therefore between young and old.— 11—
Thesecond implication of f'=n follows directly fromequation
13. At the optimum, the government would collectno tax and make no
transfers: (1—0 )wL + T =0. The government'scapital stock is
then self—sustaining since the earnings on thatcapital are then
just sufficient to finance the growth of the government'scapital
stock at rate n: Kgf' =nKg
=(g/Kg)Kg
=kg.This striking result
should not be misunderstood. it should first be reiteratedthat in
this economy there are no government services to befinanced7 the
condition (1— 0 )w £ + t =0implies only that there should be no taxes
to finance government capital accumulation and no distribution of
the earnings of that capital. It should also be emphasized that
this is only a condition of the steady state optimum. To reach this
optimum, the government must accumulate its capital stock through a
period of positive taxation.4
3. A Mixed Economy with Variable Labor Supply
The analysis of the previous section will now be extendedby
assuming that both the government and the individual maximizes
(23) u =ajc1 + (1— a) nc2 + pin (1—i).
As before c2 =( OWL—r—c1)(l+f'). The individual's optimization
problem again yields
4This assumes that, in the absence ofgovernment capital
accumulation, the level of capital intensity would be less than the
golden rule level, it is of course possible that the private
equilibrium will involve excessive capital accumulation (f' < n) and
that the optimal government cpaitla stock is negative, i.e., a
government debt .Butfor plausible paramete± values the private
equilibrium will imply f' > n. A sufficient but not necessary
condition for this is that k > f at the purely private equilibrium.— 12—
(24) c1 =(1—ct)(GwL—t




Substituting these expressions into 23 and simplifying yields
(26) u = +(l-4j3)Ln (OW—T)+(1—ct)£n(l+f') — Ow.
The government's problem is to maximize 26 subject to the capital
accumulation constraint of equation 13.
Note first that if the available tax is restricted to a
proportional tax on labor income, i.e., if t=0,equation 26
reduces to equation 18 of the previous section. Since the capital
accumulation constraint is unchanged, the optimum condition is again
f'=n. The crucial reason for this identical result with endogenous
labor supply is found in equation 25. With t=0,£ =l/(1+ç3)and is
independent of the proportional tax rate 0 .Thus,in this case the
variable labor supply is irrelevant and the individual always choose
the optimal labor supply.5 Of course, this insensitivity of the
labor supply to a proportional tax is a property of the log—linear
utility function.
In an alternative case in which the government is constrained
to collect a lump sum tax (t>0),or to make a lump sum transfer to
everyone (1<0),the first order condition for maximizing u
5Note that L= l/(l+ç3) is the optinum chosen in the command
economy.— 13—
inequation 26 with respect to k does not yield f'n. If thetax
system must distort the supply of labor, the golden rule isno
longer an optimum condition.
A more general and more interesting constraint isto require
that any tax revenue that is raised be raised ina particular
non—proportional way, e.g., a progressivity requirement that sets
the ratio of —to (1— 0)w.6 This case is interesting because,as
noted in Section 2, when f'n there is no need forany positive or
negative tax revenue; the income that the governmentearns on its
capital is just sufficient to finance the requiredsteady state
accumulation of government capital. But if no tax revenue or
transfer is needed, the tax parameter values r= (1—0 )= 0does not
violate any progressivity requirement. Soreaching a steady state
equilibrium with the first best allocation of resources isnot
inconsistent with a requirement that any tax must be collected(or
transfer made) in a progressive way.
4. Generalizing the Results
Although the specific results derived in Sections 2 and 3
reflected the assumption of a log—linear utility function anda
linear wage tax, the analysis suggests that the basicconclusions
can be extended to a more general specification of the problem. It
is clear from the derivation of equation 13 that thiscapital
accumulation constraint can be written more generally as
(27) —T =(f'—n)[kZ—(w£—T—c1)(l+n)1]
6Progressivity as such is of no interest if all individualsare
identical, but the current analysis can be extended directly to the
case in which there is a distribution of wage rates.— 14—
whereT is the tax collected from the workers andcan be any
function of w,2. and c1. The significant feature of equation 27is
that at the golden rule level of capitalintensity T is zero. Thus,
if the government can follow a tax andaccumulation policy that
eventually leads to a capital intensity at which f'n, it isno
longer necessary to levy any tax. The reason for thisis, as noted
is Section 2, that at f'=n the earnings of thegovernment's capital
stock are just enough to finance its steady staterate of growth.
With T=O and f'=n, the worker's problem is tomaximize
(28) u =u[c1,(wi —c1)(1-I-n),1—i].
This has exactly the sane first order conditions withrespect to c1
as in the command economy: u1 =u2(1+n).The first order condition
with respect to Z is u3 =(l+n)wu2.Substituting w=f-kf' for w and
rewriting this as w =f-nk,we obtain u3 =(l+n)(f'—nk)u2,the same
first order condition as equation 4 in the commandeconony.
Thus since no capital accumulation tax needactually be
collected at the optimum, any tax system that canmove the capital
stock over time to the golden rule level of capitalintensity can
thereby achieve a first—best optimum for the economy withany
utility function.
5. Government Spending and Optimal CapitalIntensity
Of course, taxes may also be needed in eguilbrium to finance
government outlays. If such taxes alter the supply of labor, it
will not generally be optimal to achieve a golden rule levelof
capital intensity. But if the supply of labor is exogenously fixed— 15—
(asin Section 2) or if the utility function andthe tax structure
imply that individuals choose an unchanging level of laborsupply,
the optimality of the golden rule capitalintensity may persist.
Consider first the case of fixed laborsupply and a log—linear
utility function. If government spending does notenter the
individual utility function or enters inan additively separable
way, the individual's first order conditions will remainunchanged
and the government's problem will, as inequation 18, be to maximize
(29) u =• +Zn(OwL —-r) +(1—ct)Ln(l+f').
The need to finance government spending ofg per worker changes the
government's capital stock accumulation equation to
(30) kg=x9f'+[(l0 )w £ +t —9JN
or, in steady state equilibrium,
(31) (n—f') k £ =(1—0)wz +t— g.
Theprivate capital accumulation condition remains unchanged in the
form of equation 9. Combining that condition withequation 31
implies the overall capital accumulation condition
(32) g =(f'—n)[kz—(QW £ —t-c1)(1+nY1J+[(1—0)w £ +rJ
The first right hand side term in square brackets is the
government's equilibrium capital stock per worker, i.e., the— 16—
differencebetween the equilibrium capital stockper worker and the
equilibrium private capital per worker.Multiplying this by f—n
gives the government's capital income inexcess of the amount that
it needs to maintain the capital stock. Thesecond right hand side
term is square brackets in the government's taxrevenue per worker.
Thus the right hand side gives the government'stotal net receipts
per worker that finances the government spending ofg per worker.
For g>0, we can now have f'>n and positive taxrevenue.




using also w =f-kf'and c1 =a(OwZ—t).Substitutingthis
expression into 29 gives the government's maximand:
r (f-nk)-q
(34) u =4, +Zn___________________÷(1—a)Zn (l+f').
Ll+(l-a )(f'-n)
(l+n)lJ
The derivative of u with respect to k gives the firstorder
condition
£ (f—n) (1—a)(1+n)-f" (l—a)f' (35) — — + =0
£ (f—nk)—g 1+(1—a) (f'—n) (1+n' 1+f'
This is satisfied for f'n, showing that, with a fixed laborsupply,
the introduction of government spending has no effector optimal
capital intensity.— 17—
Twofeatures of this result deserve comment.First, although
the conclusion was derived for a linearwage tax, the same analysis
carries through for any tax that is a functionof the wage income.
Second, it follows directly from equation 32that, with f'=n,
government spending and taxes are equal. Anypermanent increase in
government spending should therefore be financed byan equal
increase in taxes.
Section 3 showed that, in the more generalcase of a variable
labor supply, the golden rule level of capitalintensity will remain
optimal if the tax does not alter the supply of labor.This
optimality property persists if the tax is used to finance
government outlays. Introducing government outlays alters the
capital accumulation constraint but not the individual's
optimization problem. As before (equation 26), thegovernment's
maximand can be written
(36) u =+(l-i-p)zn( Owt —T)+(l—a)n(li-f') —pnOw.
If the tax is proportional (so that I=0),the individual's
optimization implies Z =l/(l+p)and 36 can be rewritten as
(37) u =+nOw +(1—a)jn(1+f').
In place of equation 33, the capital accumulation constraintimplies
[ f—nk-g(l+p) (38) 9w = I
14(1—a)(f'—n)(l+n)1— 18—
Substitutingthis into 37 gives
f—nk —g(l+p)1 (39)u =+Zn
J+ (1—ct)£n(1÷f').
V—n) (1+n)'J
A comparison of equations 39 and 34 showsimmediately that the first
order condition will again be f'=n. Thus,even with a variable
labor supply and a positive amount ofgovernment spending to be
financed, optimal government policy requiresestablishing the golden
rule level of capital intensity if the availabletax does not alter
the actual supply of labor.
The significance of this result follows from theempirical
finding that the uncompensated labor supply elasticity isquite
small7 and therefore that aproportional tax has little effect on
labor supply.8 If this is a valid approximation, itindicates that
the implications of the fixed labor supplycase remain relevant in
considering the implications of optimal taxation and capital
accumulation.
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7See the evidence summarized in Atkinsonand Stiglitz (1980),
chapter 2. Rosen (1976) shows that the labor supplyelasticity of
married women is substantially greater than that ofmarried men.
8flausman's (1981) analysis shows that theactual progressive
income tax has significant labor supply effects eventhough a
proportional tax would not.-19-
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